Why I Find Foucault Useless

People periodically try to convince me that I should pay attention to the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault, because it will enrich archaeological interpretations of the past. Maybe. But here is why I remain dubious, after reading various books and articles by and about Foucault.

Highly abstract theories and concepts—such as Foucault’s governmentality, power and discipline (things archaeologists have mentioned)—describe the operation of the world on a very general level. This kind of approach, termed “grand theory” by C. Wright Mills, is “so general that its practitioners cannot logically get down to observation. They never, as grand theorists, get down from the higher generalities to problems in their historical and structural contexts” (Mills 1959:33). This is pretty basic stuff in social science epistemology: grand theory is so abstract that it cannot explain individual cases or variation among cases (Abbott 2004:218; Ellen 2010; Mjøset 2001; Smith 2011). My post. "What is wrong with abstract social theory" has links to other posts and resources.  Foucaultian power and governmentality simply exist—presumably for all societies—so how can they explain change and variation?

In Abend’s (2008) classification of types of theory in sociology, Foucault’s concepts are examples of theory type 3 (a statement about the meaning of social phenomena, an interpretation, a reading, or a way of making sense) or type 5 (a weltanschauung, an overall perspective from which one sees and interprets the world). What this means is that Foucault’s concepts are of limited utility in explaining specific social phenomena, and their empirical adequacy cannot be tested. In the words of Kevin Fisher (2009:440), for archaeoloigsts, abstract theory like this “does not offer the tools needed to analyze the material remains on the ground.” I discuss this notion further in Smith (2015, n.d.). See my previous post on Abend's scheme of theory.

Pierre Bourdieu recognized this problem with Foucault’s work. As reported by Callewaert (2006:92), Bourdieu complained that “the philosophical method was used [by Foucault] for answering questions that are basically empirical sociological questions.” Foucault’s methods were faulty from the perspectives of both historiography and social science methodology (Garland 1987). In fact, his method of social analysis has been called “politically engaged journalism” (Vallois 2015). If one is interested in abstract, philosophical notions about the human condition, then the work of Foucault may be full of insights. But if one is interested in a social-scientific explanation of the dynamics of past cities and human societies, one has to look elsewhere for concepts and models.

In the social sciences, theory that is more grounded and testable is termed “middle-range theory” (Hedström and Udéhn 2009; Merton 1968:39-72; Sampson 2010). In Abend’s (2008) scheme, this corresponds to theory type 1 (a general proposition about the relationship between two variables) and type 2 (an explanation of a particular social phenomenon). In this approach explanation consists of identifying the causal mechanisms responsible for observed changes: “to explain a fact is to exhibit the mechanism that makes the system tick” (Bunge 2004:182). This is part of a basic scientific approach to archaeological knowledge. See my post, "Why is it important to strive for a more scientific archaeology?"

So, if you don’t care about explanation and causality, or about being able to tell when your interpretation is wrong, then the work of Michel Foucault may be fine for you. But for me, I cannot find anything interesting or useful in his work. 

(And, of course, I am really bugged by Foucault using the term "archaeology" to refer to the past history of any old thing. It is insulting that Google searches for archaeology plus something else turn up Foucault instead of turning up archaeology!)

Abbott, Andrew

2004 Methods of Discovery: Heuristics for the Social Sciences. Norton, New York.

Abend, Gabriel

2008 The Meaning of "Theory". Sociological Theory 26: 173-199.

Bunge, Mario

2004 How Does It Work?: The Search for Explanatory Mechanisms. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2): 182-210.

Callewaert, Staf

2006 Bourdieu, Critic of Foucault: The Case of Empirical Social Science Against Double-Game-Philosophy. Theory, Culture and Society 23 (6): 73-98.

Ellen, Roy

2010 Theories in Anthropology and "Anthropological Theory". Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 16: 387-404.

Fisher, Kevin D.

2009 Placing Social Interaction: An Integrative Approach to Analyzing Past Built Environments. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 28: 439-457.

Garland, David

1987 Foucault's Discipline and Punish: An Explosition and Critique. Law and Social Inquiry 11 (4): 847-880.

Hedström, Peter and Lars Udéhn

2009 Analytical Sociology and Theories of the Middle Range. In The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology, edited by Peter Hedström and Peter Bearman, pp. 25-49. Oxford University Press, New York.

Merton, Robert K.

1968 Social Theory and Social Structure. 3rd ed. Free Press, New York.

Mills, C. Wright

1959 The Sociological Imagination. Oxford University Press, New York.

Mjøset, Lars

2001 Theory: Conceptions in the Social Sciences. In International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, pp. 15641-15647. Elsevier, New York.

Sampson, Robert J.

2010 Eliding the Theory/Research and Basic/Applied Divides: Implications of Merton's 'Middle Range'. In Robert K. Merton: Sociology of Science and Sociology as Science, edited by Craig Calhoun, pp. 63-78. Columbia University Press, New York.

Smith, Michael E.

2011 Empirical Urban Theory for Archaeologists. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory 18: 167-192.

2015 How can Archaeologists Make Better Arguments? The SAA Archaeological Record 15 (4): 18-23.

n.d.   Archaeology and Social Science Inquiry. Antiquity  (accepted for publication).

Vallois, Nicolas

2015 Michel Foucault and the History of Economic Thought. Œconomia: History, Methodology, Philosophy 5 (4): 461-490.

How to make stronger arguments

 

My paper "How can archaeologists make better arguments?" has recently been published in the SAA Archaeological Record. While this is just a short paper in a non-peer-reviewed newsletter, I think it is one of my more important publications. Many aspects of contemporary archaeology -- particularly the archaeology of complex societies -- annoy and depress me. I use this blog to blow off steam about issues of data, theory, empirical adequacy, quality control, and such. I have come to the realization much of my dissatisfaction with publishing today revolves around the low quality of the empirical arguments in much of the literature today. People draw conclusions that are not warranted by the data, and then those results become enshrined as facts for future research and publishing (they are published! by a well-known archaeologist! they must be true!). Yet they are not facts at all; they are speculations with little empirical content.

I did some sniffing around the internet for my graduate theory seminar last year. I found that the topic of making arguments, like other epistemological topics, was rarely covered in graduate theory classes in the U.S. This surprised me at first, but then it made sense. If graduate students weren't getting training in how to make a rigorous argument -- how to test models with data, how to use theory to construct causal arguments -- then this helps explain the sorry state of archaeological argument. The alternative to rigorous empirical epistemology is philosophical, abstract theory, without much empirical content.

It seemed to me that rather than just ranting and raving about theory and epistemology in this blog, I should write a clear and direct guide to empirical arguments in archaeology. Some of the intellectual background is provide in my 2011 urban theory paper, but the new article is short and direct. So, if you haven't seen it yet, please download the paper and read it. And then please follow the advice. I want you to have a clearer view of archaeological epistemology, and I want you to make better arguments. This is not altruism on my part; instead, this advice comes from my distress at the state of archaeological knowledge today. If everyone were to make better arguments, the whole field would be vastly improved and perhaps I could stop being embarrassed when I have to explain away sloppy archaeological papers to my colleagues in other disciplines.

Smith, Michael E.    2015    How can Archaeologists Make Better Arguments? The SAA Archaeological Record 15(4): 18-23.

Smith, Michael E.    2011    Empirical Urban Theory for Archaeologists. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory 18:167-192.

How do archaeologists make arguments?

An unfortunate trend in archaeology today consists of making arguments using faulty logic and faulty methods of argumentation. This is one of my biggest beefs with the work of postmodern/postprocessual archaeologists. They don't test models or hypotheses, their theories are true by definition, and their arguments are based more on speculation than on empirical evaluation.

A colleague remarked recently I that don't seem to like archaeological works that deal with things like negotiation, identity, and agency. But these are important social science concepts and they all have their use. In archaeology today, however, they are buzz words. They are used more to signal adherence to a theoretical perspective than as analytical concepts that do intellectual work. Brubaker and Cooper (2000:19) talk about this with respect to identity; when scholars say that identity is "multiple, unstable, in flux, constructed, negotiated, and so on," these terms serve as "gestures signaling a stance rather than words conveying a meaning." For me, the concept of negotiation as a concept in collective action theory is great (Margater Levi; Blanton and Fargher; etc.). But when used as a postmodern buzz word, it really turns me off.

Anyway, back to arguments. Here is a form of argumentation that I have seen many times in recent years.

(1)  Specify a theme, framed in terms of a high-level philosophical social theory.
(2)  Discuss your archaeological data.
(3)  Claim that the theory provides an interpretation of the data. 


Now there is a problem here, one that some some writers acknowledge and others don't. High-level social theory is too far removed from data to actually provide any kind of empirical evaluation or test. That is, you can't come up with a way of establishing that the theory is correct or incorrect, or even applicable or not applicable. Why? Because high-level social theory is simply true. It floats high above the messy empirical world, impervious to attempts to test or evaluate it. And it is so ethereal that you can't directly evaluate it on the ground. If this isn't clear, check out Ellen (2010, Smith (2011), or Abend (2008). In the words of Kevin Fisher,

"While Giddens, Goffman and others [that is, high-level social theory] provide an overall theoretical orientation or examining the relationship between architecture, interaction and social transformation, their work does not offer the tools needed to analyze the material remains on the ground" (Fisher 2009: 440).

So only very naive scholars will stop with step #3. Many archaeologists recognize these limitations of high-level social theory, and they see the need for some kind of middle-level construct to justify their claim. Here are two faulty alternatives I've seen in recent publications:

(4A) Cite another study, perhaps from another region, where a similar argument was made. If someone else has already made the claim in another context (whether or not it is warranted, correct, or applicable), then I can make a similar claim in my context. The technical term for this kind of ploy is "empty citation" (Harzing 2002). This is a  citation to a work that does not contain any original data for the phenomenon underconsideration; the works are cited merely to lend an aura of support for anargument, when in fact they contain no empirical support. This is not a valid form of empirical argument.

(4B) Cite a study showing that one's particular interpretation fits with some comparative data, somewhere in the world. This is a definite epistemological improvement over step 4A, but it still does not constitute a valid argument. For example, suppose I claim that imported goods from distant lands were seen as imbued with power and magic at sites I have excavated. It will be hard or impossible to confirm this statement empirically with archaeological data, but I can cite Mary Helms to the effect that in some documented societies, this was indeed the case. But unless Helms shows that this is always the case, that the pattern exists in every known ethnographic and historical society, then this citation only provides plausibility for my argument. It certainly does not provide confirmation, or even empirical support short of confirmation. Now you can turn this into a reasonable analogical argument with a good comparative study. Pick a sample. Determine the contextual conditions under which exotic goods are seen to have power, and those under which that situation does not obtain. Compare your case to the comparative data, and make the appropriate interpretation. But no one seems to do this because it is much easier to make a quick speculative interpretation than to go out and do a big comparative study.

Well, I guess we simply cannot test our high-level social interpretation of archaeological data. Let me quote the clear-thinking sociologist Andrew Abbott (2004)  here:

• “in order to be tested, all of these ideas and implications must be framed in such a way that they can be wrong.” (p.215)  [See my prior post, where I reference Steve Haber's discussion of this issue --MES]
• “it is surprising how many researchers—even graduate students in their dissertations—propose arguments that can’t be wrong. For example, research proposals of the form, ‘I am going to take a neo-institutionalist view of mental-hospital foundings’ or ‘This paper analyzes sexual assaults by combining a Goffmanian account of interaction and a semniotic approach to language’ are not interesting because they do not propose an idea that can be wrong. They boil down to classifying a phenomenon or, seen the other way around, simply illustrating a theory.” (p.216)
• “Thinking without alternatives is a particular danger in ethnography and historical [and archaeological --MES] analysis, where the natural human desire to develop cohesive interpretations (and the need to present a cohesive interpretation at the end of the research) prompts us to notice only those aspects of reality that accord with our current ideas.” (p.216)

So if this common form of archaeological argumentation (high-level theory + data = speculative interpretation) is faulty, then how SHOULD archaeologists construct arguments? If you haven't read The Craft of Research  by Booth et al (2008), go buy the book and read it right now. Although designed for undergraduates, it contains much of value to graduate students and professionals. Here is how they suggest making arguments (chapter 8, "Making Good Arguments"):

1. What is the claim?
2. What reasons support the claim?
3. What evidence supports the reasons?
4. Acknowledge alternatives / complications / objections
5. What warrant or principle justifies connecting the reasons to the claim?

I won't elaborate on this scheme; I don't want to give you an excuse to avoid looking at Booth et al. And one more suggestion, if you have ANY interest at all in the topic of identity, and you have not read Brubaker and Cooper (2000), you are doing yourself a big disservice.

References:

Abbott, Andrew
2004    Methods of Discovery: Heuristics for the Social Sciences. Norton, New York.

Abend, Gabriel
2008    The Meaning of "Theory". Sociological Theory 26: 173-199.

Booth, Wayne C., Gergory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams
2008    The Craft of Research. 3rd ed. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Brubaker, Rogers and Frederick Cooper
2000    Beyond "Identity". Theory and Society 29: 1-47.

Ellen, Roy
2010    Theories in Anthropology and "Anthropological Theory". Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 16: 387-404.

Fisher, Kevin D.
2009    Placing Social Interaction: An Integrative Approach to Analyzing Past Built Environments. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 28: 439-457.

Harzing, Anne-Wil
2002    Are Our Referencing Errors Undermining our Scholarship and Credibility? The Case of Expatriate Failure Rates. Journal of Organizational Behavior 23: 127-148.

Smith, Michael E.2011    Empirical Urban Theory for Archaeologists. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory 18: 167-192.

Can causality be opposed to explanation?

Greetings from Toronto, where I gave some talks and had a great time with the archaeologists at the University of Toronto.

Actually, I don't particularly like epistemology.

I just read American Anthropologist’s 2012 review article on archaeological publications in 2011 (Hauser 2012). I came away confused about author Mark Hauser’s epistemology. I can’t seem to translate his approach into my own understanding of social science concepts of explanation and causality. Like many archaeologists, Hauser seems reluctant to discuss these things clearly and explicitly, leaving readers to puzzle them out from fragmentary and cryptic phrases.

I was particularly confused by two statements in Hauser’s paper:

·       “addressing long-standing questions about agriculture with new data require a shift from causality to explanations of process in specified contexts.” (p. 185)

·       “One major shift was a general move from the search for causes to explanation of cultivation, domestication, and farming.” (p. 186).

I find this puzzling, because to me, explanation means finding the cause for something. So what does Hauser mean by a shift from causality to explanation? His phrasing suggests that causality is the old and bad way of looking at things, while explanation is a new and good approach. This statement might give a clue:

·       “interpretive narratives find their expressions in situated explanations—a grounding in the messy idiosyncrasies of evidence—context—culture—history that run counter to more ambitious inclinations to craft explanatory models of history at larger scales.” (p.184)

Leaving aside the confusing conjunction of four words with hyphens, this statement suggests that Hauser is advocating explanation at a small scale. But does he mean a smaller spatial scale (we should concentrate on explaining a particular event in a particular place, not a large-scale spatial process like an empire or world system)? Or does he mean a smaller analytical scale (we should explain this particular household, and not households in general)? In my view, we need to explain things at a variety of spatial and analytical scales, and it doesn’t make much sense to prefer one level over another. It depends on the research question one is asking.

To me, talk of explanations at different scales suggests the concepts of proximate and ultimate causality. These concepts were first articulated in biology by Ernst Mayr (Mayr 1961). Proximate causes concern immediate factors such as ontogeny, and ultimate causes produce evolutionary explanations. While new work in biology has complicated this dichotomy, the basic distinction remains important in that field (Laland et al. 2011).

The proximate-ultimate distinction in causality is also important in the social sciences:

·       “ultimate explanations are concerned with why a behavior exists, and proximate explanations are concerned with how it works.”(Scott-Phillips et al. 2011:38)

Some writers parallel the approach of Laland et al in biology by advocating a more complex concept of social causation, but retaining the basic insight of the proximate/ultimate distinction. John Gerring (2005, 2012), for example, talks about “causal distance”: how far is the cause from the event it generates? Lieberson and Lynn (2002) use the phrases “underlying conditions” and “precipitating conditions” for these concepts.

But I don’t think this is the kind of thing Hauser has in mind, since he seems hostile to (or at least dismissive of) the concept of causality.

OK, let’s step back and look at what kinds of explanatory models are available in the social sciences (and, by extension, in archaeology). I always return to Charles Tilly for this kind of thing. I’m not a very good abstract thinker, and Tilly clarifies many epistemological issues in terms I can understand. According to Tilly, five explanatory strategies are available in the social and historical sciences. The following is my paraphrasing of: Tilly (2001:365) and Tilly and Goodin (2006:12-13); see also Tilly (2008). The text following *** are my own comments.

1.     Skepticism. The world is too complex to explain. *** I think this would be the strong postmodern position.

2.     Law-seeking accounts. Social life is said to exhibit empirical regularities that at their highest level take the form of laws; explanation then consists of subsuming particular cases under broadly validated empirical generalizations or even universal laws. *** This  is “logical positivism,” a framework associated with Carl Hempel. Binford and the new archaeologists promoted this approach to explanation, EVEN THOUGH IT HAD ALREADY BEEN DISCREDITED FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE BY PHILOSOPHERS OF SCIENCE! This was one of the biggest mistakes of Binford and the new archaeology, and it set archaeological epistemology back for decades!

3.     Propensity accounts. Social units are seen as self-directing, whether driven by emotions, motives, interests, rational choices, genes, or something else. Explanation then consists of reconstructing the state of the social unit—for example, an individual’s beliefs at a given point in time and space—and plausibly relating its actions to that state.  *** Most examples of propensity accounts follow methodological individualism, or the standard model in economics that says social phenomenon can be explained by the goals, decisions, and behavior of individuals. But other individual-level approaches, such as phenomenology, probably fit here as well.

4.     Systemic explanations. Particular features of social life are explained by specifying their connections with putative larger entities: societies, cultures, mentalities, capitalist systems, and the like. Explanation then consists of locating elements within systems. Functional explanation is a subcategory of systemic explanations. *** This includes both cultural explanations and explanations invoking large structural features such as social classes or world systems.

5.     Mechanism-based accounts. This approach claims that explanation consists of identifying in particular social phenomena reliable causal mechanisms and processes of general scope. Causal mechanisms are events that alter relations among some set of elements. Processes are frequent (but not universal) combinations and sequences of causal mechanisms. *** This is the way I think about explanation and causality. To explain an event is to identify the mechanisms responsible for bringing about that event. There is a BIG literature outside of anthropology on causal mechanisms. Some good starting points are:  (Bunge 2004), (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010), (Sampson 2011), and various works by Tilly, e.g. (Tilly 2008). Or check out Daniel Little’s blog, “Understanding Society” and search it for mechanisms.

When I started thinking about Hauser’s puzzling statements on causality and explanation, I thought Tilly’s scheme of the five explanatory approaches would clarify the situation, but now I’m not so sure. I still can’t figure out what Hauser’s explanatory position is, or how he can oppose the terms causality and explanation. I have almost given up trying to understand archaeological writing in this genre, that might be called “postmodern-light.”  I guess I will just have to admit defeat here.

My broader point is that archaeologists need to discuss epistemology more frequently, more explicitly, and more in tune with the relevant social science literature. Our own field has a rather poor track record in this area, and cultural anthropology is not much better. If this stuff is new to you, check out Tilly or Bunge or some of the other sources below. When I find myself in a conceptual difficulty, I often ask myself, “what would Tilly say about this?” Maybe you should ask that question too.

Bunge, Mario

2004    How Does It Work?: The Search for Explanatory Mechanisms. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34(2):182-210.

Gerring, John

2005    Causation: A Unified Framework for the Social Sciences. Journal of Theoretical Politics 17:163-198.

2012    Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Hauser, Mark W.

2012    The Year in Review, Archaeololgy: Messy Data, Ordered Questions. American Anthroologist 114(2):184-195.

Hedström, Peter and Petri Ylikoski

2010    Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences. Annual Review of Sociology 36:49-67.

Laland, Kevin N., Kim Sterelny, John Odling-Smee, William Hoppitt, and Tobias Uller

2011    Cause and Effect in Biology Revisited: Is Mayr's Proximate-Ultimate Dichotomy Still Useful? Science 334:1512-1515.

Lieberson, Stanley and Freda B. Lynn

2002    Barking up the Wrong Branch: Scientific Alternatives to the Current Model of Sociological Science. Annual Review of Sociology 28:1-19.

Mayr, Ernst

1961    Cause and Effect in Biology. Science 134:1501-1506.

Sampson, Robert J.

2011    Neighborhood Effects, Causal Mechanisms and the Social Structure of the City. In Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms, edited by Pierre Demeulenaere, pp. 227-249. Cambridge Universitiy Press, New York.

Scott-Phillips, Thomas C., Thomas E. Dickins, and Stuart A. West

2011    Evolutionary Theory and the Ultimate–Proximate Distinction in the Human Behavioral Sciences. Perspectives on Psychological Science 6(1):38-47.

Tilly, Charles

2001    Relational Origins of Inequality. Anthropological Theory 1(3):355-372.

2008    Explaining Social Processes. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, CO.

Tilly, Charles and Robert E. Goodin

2006    It Depends. In Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, edited by Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly, pp. 3-32. Oxford University Press, New York.