We all like to be cited in print. I
like to be cited. But recently I've come across a troubling number of citations
of my work that attribute to me a position or claim that is the opposite of
what I actually said. In the process they make me the poster child of the
negative consequences of holding those (erroneous) positions. These are all in
publications by good scholars who are not known for sloppy scholarship, so I
find the errors puzzling. Here are three recent cases.
1. Just because I use the term
"urban function" does not make me a functionalist in terms of social
theory.
Joyce,
Arthur A. (2009) Theorizing Urbanism in Ancient Mesoamerica. Ancient Mesoamerica 20:189-196.
Urban functions are activities and
institutions located in cities that affect people and society in a broader
hinterland. Another term for these might be impacts. If markets and merchants
in a city impact the hinterland, then retail market exchange is an urban
function. If ceremonies at a big urban temple are attended by rural people, or
are seen to affect an entire polity, then religion is an urban function. I have
published quite a bit about this. But does that make me a “functionalist”? Evidently
so. “Michael Smith relies on a
functionalist view of cities” (Joyce 2009:191). He had previously dismissed
the bad old theoretical approaches to cities used by outdated archaeologists as
“cultural evolutionist, functionalist, and elitist” (p. 189). Joyce uses the
term “functionalist” in the first part of his paper is in terms to refer to the
social theory of functionalism associated most strongly in anthropology with
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. Many of the new archaeologists had a
functionalist view of social complexity, explicated and criticized very clearly
by Brumfiel and Earle (1987) under the
label of “adaptationist.” If you don’t know what I’m talking about, please read
that paper.
In anthropology today,
functionalism is usually portrayed as hopelessly out of date and only of value
for the history of anthropology. The term “functionalist” and “functionalism”
have never been used in relation to urban functions (in geography or other
urban literature). So the fact I have published on urban functions in ancient
cities, or that I’ve trumped their value in defining urbanism, has nothing to
do with functionalist social theory. I don’t think I’ve ever espoused
functionalist views. So why did Art Joyce brand me a “functionalist”? I have no
idea.
2. It is bad enough to be cited
as making a claim I never made, but then please don't attribute to me all of
the negative consequences that come from making that erroneous claim.
McAnany,
Patricia A. (2013) Artisans, Ikatz, and Statecraft: Provisioning
Classic Maya Royal Courts. In Merchants,
Markets, and Exchange in the Pre-Columbian World, edited by Kenneth G.
Hirth and Joanne Pillsbury, pp. 229-254. Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, DC.
I’ve been reading this book
carefully for a book review. Most of the chapters are very good and I found
them interesting, glad that the book review forced me to read things I
might otherwise be tempted to just skim over. But I got a rude surprise at the
end of Tricia McAnany’s chapter, when I saw my 2004 ARA paper (Smith 2004) cited as the cause of a list of
negative consequences for understanding Maya economies. Here is the quote:
“Likewise, categorizing Maya economies as noncommercial (Smith 2004)
rules out the possibility of marketplace exchange before it can be explored,
ignores the commercial intensity of tribute negotiation, and misses the
historical dynamism of Maya exchange networks” (McAnany 2013, p. 246)
In my 2004 paper I present a
continuum or scale of commercialization in ancient state economies, divided up
into the following categories: uncommercialized, low commercialization,
intermediate commercialization, and advanced precapitalist commercialization. I
list the Classic Maya as an example of the “low commercialization” category. I
did NOT call the Maya economy “noncommercial” or “uncommercialized.” So the
first problem is that my published categorization of the Maya economy was
misstated. But I am also listed as the poster child for a series of negative
consequences that flow from failing to acknowledge some level of commercial
exchange for the Maya. This is very frustrating, because I largely agree that “primitivising”
the Maya economy (by denying commercial exchange) has negative consequences. But
please don’t blame me for a position I didn’t take.
3. I don't view the main purpose
of my archaeological research as validating prior historical categories.
Steere,
Benjamin A. and Stephen A. Kowalewski (2012) Wealth Stratification
in Ancient Mesoamerica. Social Evolution
and History 11(1):20-48.
These authors present two approaches
to studies of social stratification in ancient Mesoamerica. The good approach,
which they follow, “is etic and offers inductive description of the social
distribution of wealth” (p.20). The bad approach, which evidently means me, is “to
identify legal or emic status positions as these may be defined by indigenous
documents ... or by prior theory” (p.20). Archaeologists
who follow this approach, “look for material patterns consistent with the historically
named social categories (see, e.g., Smith et al. 1999). The archaeology then
illustrates what is already known.” The problem with these statements is
the same as for the McAnany case: I am cited as taking a position opposite to
what is actually stated in the cited source, and in the process I am made the whipping
boy for the negative consequences of that (erroneous) position.
Here is an outline of Smith et al (1999).
1.
Describe houses we excavated at Yautepec.
2.
Compare their forms to other Aztec houses known from
archaeology and ethnohistory.
3.
Present the sizes of the Yautepec houses in a table and
graph.
4.
Discuss briefly some of the theoretical and comparative
literature linking house size to wealth.
We did NOT begin with Aztec emic
categories, and such categories did NOT structure the fieldwork or the analysis
of the data. And even if we had followed this kind of procedure, it would be
hard to claim that “archaeology then illustrates what is already known” because
no one knew much about Aztec house size prior to my excavations at Yautepec and other Morelos sites; such
information is not found in the documentary record. But we didn’t structure the
paper this way.
What really steams me about this
mischaracterization of my work is that it claims my archaeological interpretations
are limited to validating the historical record, and are thus structured by
that record. But one of the methodological contributions I like to think I have
made to the discipline lies precisely in this area of how archaeology and
ethnohistory should be compared and related to one another. My basic position
is that the archaeological record needs to be analyzed independently of
documents so as to avoid bias, and thus detailed comparisons of archaeology and
ethnohistory, or joint models, should only be done after each record has been
analyzed independently. For my methodological contributions to this theme, please
check these works: (Smith 1987a; Smith 1987b;
Smith 1992a; Smith 1992b; Smith 1993). After 1993 I didn’t harp on this
theme as much, but it certainly informs all of my Aztec research since then (e.g., Smith 2008; Smith 2012; Smith, and Berdan 2003).
So it really bothers me when it is suggested, in error, that one of my papers
violates my own methodological precepts. Arghhhhhhhhh.
I’m somewhat puzzled by these
errors, and I will refrain from trying to figure out why they were made. These
are all good scholars whose work I read and admire. But for some reason, I am
cited as the bad guy in their straw-man arguments. Perhaps being cited in error
is better than not being cited at all. As they say, “There is no such thing as
bad publicity.” But still, I’d much rather be cited for what I really say.
Brumfiel, Elizabeth M. and Timothy K. Earle (1987)
Specialization, Exchange, and Complex Societies: An Introduction. In Specialization,
Exchange, and Complex Societies, edited by Elizabeth M. Brumfiel and
Timothy K. Earle, pp. 1-9. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Smith, Michael E.
(1987a) Archaeology and the Aztec
Economy: The Social Scientific Use of Archaeological Data. Social Science History 11:237-259.
Smith, Michael E. (1987b) The Expansion of the Aztec Empire: A Case
Study in the Correlation of Diachronic Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Data.
American Antiquity 52:37-54.
Smith, Michael E.
(1992a) Braudel's Temporal
Rhythms and Chronology Theory in Archaeology.
In Annales, Archaeology, and Ethnohistory,
edited by A. Bernard Knapp, pp. 23-34. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Smith, Michael E.
(1992b) Rhythms of Change in
Postclassic Central Mexico: Archaeology, Ethnohistory, and the Braudellian
Model. In Annales, Archaeology, and Ethnohistory, edited by A. Bernard Knapp,
pp. 51-74. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Smith, Michael E.
(1993) Houses and the Settlement
Hierarchy in Late Postclassic Morelos: A Comparison of Archaeology and
Ethnohistory. In Prehispanic Domestic Units in Western Mesoamerica: Studies of the
Household, Compound, and Residence, edited by Robert S. Santley and Kenneth
G. Hirth, pp. 191-206. CRC Press, Boca Raton.
Smith, Michael E.
(2004) The Archaeology of Ancient
State Economies. Annual Review of
Anthropology 33:73-102.
Smith, Michael E.
(2008) Aztec City-State Capitals. University Press of Florida,
Gainesville.
Smith, Michael E.
(2012) The Aztecs. 3rd ed. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.
Smith, Michael E. and Frances F. Berdan
(editors) (2003) The
Postclassic Mesoamerican World. University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City.
Smith, Michael E., Cynthia Heath-Smith and
Lisa Montiel (1999) Excavations of Aztec Urban Houses at
Yautepec, Mexico. Latin American
Antiquity 10:133-150.
